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Abstract 
This article builds a case for the imperative of boosting the manufacturing sector as the surest 
way of tackling Africa’s development challenges of fragile economic growth, poverty, inequality 
and vulnerability to socio-economic shocks. In doing so, the article firstly analyses the critical 
role manufacturing sector plays in a country’s socio-economic development. Secondly, it 
assesses the status of the sector in Africa by gauging its growth rate, over time, and its 
contribution to GDP.  Thirdly, it identifies the factors which have undermined the growth of the 
sector.  Fourthly, it draws an agenda for revival and boosting of the manufacturing sector, while 
avoiding the mistakes of the past industrialization episodes. Finally, some policy and strategic 
recommendations are drawn to guide the next generation of a manufacturing-led development 
paradigm by putting emphasis on the imperative of forging strong partnerships between the 
private and public sector. 
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Africa’s economic performance in the last fifteen years has been characterized as “impressive” 
due to enhanced real GDP and per capita GDP growth.  This positive growth has been due in part 
to the rise of emerging economies, whose demand for raw materials represents a major 
opportunity for resource-rich African countries. This economic dynamism was complemented by 
improved environment of macroeconomic stability, implementation of structural reforms and 
improved governance.  The improved investment climate spearheaded by reforms in the policy, 
legal and regulatory framework, attracted foreign direct investment (FDI) into the continent. 
 
However, the seemingly positive growth outlook has not translated into less inequality, reduced 
poverty, and improved diversity of the economies, job creation, structural transformation and 
technological upgrading.  These negative aspects of Africa’s growth performance are a clear 
testimony to the absence of an essential component of structural transformation in the continent’s 
socio-economic development strategy namely industrialization.  It has long been recognized that 
industrialization is one of the main engines of economic growth, especially in the early stages of 
development.  Its essential characteristics include: Firstly, an increase in the proportion of the 
national income derived from manufacturing activities and from secondary industry in general, 
except perhaps for cyclical interruptions. Secondly, a rising trend in the proportion of working 
population engaged in manufacturing.  Thirdly, an associated increase in the income per head of 
the population (Bagchi, 1990). It needs to be emphasized that few countries have been 
economically successful without industrializing. Only in circumstances such as extraordinary 
abundance of natural resources or land have countries been able to do so (UNIDO, 2009).  
However, even in the latter case, it all depends on how effectively the resources are managed to 
avoid the resource-curse and the dutch-disease (Moshi, 2014). 
 
The article aims at building a case for the imperative of boosting the manufacturing sector as the 
surest way of tackling Africa’s development challeng s of fragile economic growth, poverty, 
inequality and vulnerability to socio-economic shocks.  Firstly, the article analyses the critical 
role that manufacturing sector plays in a country’s socio-economic development. Emphasis is 
placed on the fact that the sector is the most dynamic one in terms of employment creation, 
enhancement of technological capacity and incomes, just to mention a few. Secondly, it assesses 
the status of the sector in Africa by gauging its growth rate, over time, and its contribution to 
GDP.  Thirdly, it identifies the factors which have undermined the growth of the sector.  Such 
factors include: the role played by policies merchandised by the IFIs, in the context of the neo-
liberal development paradigm, with its attendant policy and financial dependence on donors, 
coupled with unrealistic conditions. Fourth, it draws an agenda for revival and boosting of the 
manufacturing sector, while avoiding the mistakes of the past industrialization episodes. Some 
components of the agenda encompass; an enhanced role of the state, strengthened capacity of the 
private sector and home grown policies and strategies with a view to scale-up ownership of the 
continent’s development agenda. Finally, some policy and strategic recommendations are drawn 
to guide the next generation of a manufacturing-led d velopment paradigm by putting emphasis 
on the imperative of forging strong partnerships betwe n the private and public sector. 
 
 




2.0 Conceptual Framework 
 
This section focuses on theoretical considerations with regard to two aspects.  One, is in relation 
to structural transformation of which industrialization is seem as a critical component of that 
process. Two, is technological upgrading and innovati n, which are essential ingredients for 
long-run productivity growth, again critical inputs and outputs of an industrialization process. 
 
We should point out from the outset that, since 1950, all developing countries that have 
experienced rapid growth and catch up have been succe sful industrialisers and industrial 
exporters (Van Ark and Timmer, 2003).  Countries that fell behind in aggregate terms were also 
the weakest industrial performers.  In the past fifty years, manufacturing had been the main 
engine of growth in developing countries. In other words, the structural change involved the 
shifts from agriculture to industry has been a key ingredient of successful economic development 
(Szirmai, 2008). 
 
In the context of structural change, Lin (2012) argues that globalization provides an almost 
infinite potential for industrialization in many low-income countries. He contends that whereas 
economic growth based on exploitation of natural resources or agricultural land eventually faces 
the constraint of shortages of quantity, development strategy based on producing manufacturing 
goods for global market benefits from economies of cale due to increasingly lower unit costs of 
production. This being the case, virtually any country can identify products for which it has overt 
or latent comparative advantage and scale it up almost without limit thereby creating its own 
niche in the world market. 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of industrialization a d its role in structural transformation, 
mainstream development economics has paid only limited attention to this subject.  This may be 
explained mainly by failure of industrial policies in developing countries during the 1960s and 
1970s and the theoretical argument of “state – failure” with regard to pursuing policies that tend 
to create unsustainable and socially costly distortions in the economy.  Although this view has 
been challenged by those who associate the successful industrialization in East Asia with the 
actively pursued industrial policies, widespread skepticism about industrial policies endures 
(Parc and Saggi, 2006). 
 
It needs however to be emphasized that establishing empirical regularities of the changing 
patterns of industrial structure and technological upgrading across the world is not a 
straightforward exercise.  However, what is not contestable is the fact that industrialization has 
been a key feature by which successful developing economies have lifted themselves out of 
poverty. 
 
A second aspect of structural transformation is technological upgrading and innovation, which 
are essential ingredients for long-run productivity growth.  In low-income countries where 
budgets for research and development are scarce and industries located far away from 
technological frontier, technological upgrading and innovation typically take the form of 
adaptation and adoption of known technologies rathe an introduction of new ones-(Lin, 




op.cit.).  However, effective adaptation and diffusion are dependent on absorptive capacities of 
firms and countries (Abramovitz, 1989; Lundvall, 1992).  Nonetheless, observed patterns of 
technological adoption, education, and R & D strategies indicate that appropriate innovation 
strategies depend on endowerment structure and stages of development. 
 
Another important aspect associated with structural t nsformation is that of economic 
diversification.  Not only it protects countries from vulnerability to shocks, it also reflects the 
pace at which low income economies reallocate their resources to take advantage of unfolding 
opportunities.  While high-income countries tend to exhibit substantial convergence in 
productivity levels across sectors, the situation is generally the opposite in low-income countries.  
Therefore, structural change is both a cause and cosequence of sustained economic growth 
(Chenery, 1986). 
 
3.0 Africa’s Industrialization Status 
 
After fifty years of independence agriculture remains Africa’s main source of employment and 
livelihood with around 60 percent of its labour force employed in the sector.  But its share in 
GDP is much smaller accounting for an average of 25 percent, indicating its relatively low level 
of productivity.  On the contrary, the continent’s manufacturing sector is relatively small with an 
average contribution of only 10 per cent to GDP.  However, the degree of industrialization 
differs significantly across countries and depends, among other factors, on the stage of 
development and the availability of natural resources.  Countries with low per capita income 
levels and those with abundant resource wealth tend to have very small manufacturing sectors, 
often around 5 per cent of GDP or less.  (AfDB, 2013). 
 
The emerging picture of performance of the above key sectors which are supposed to be the 
focus and the drivers of transformation process is that of a continent experiencing very little 
structural change through industrialization.  In the ensuring sub-sections, we analyse more 
deeply the performance. 
 
3.1 Trends of Structural Change 
It has been alluded to in the preceding section that African economies exhibit signs of limited 
structural transformation.  No wonder that even the ov rall GDP growth rates have been low by 
either Asian or BRICs standards.  In 1965, agriculture value added represented 22 per cent of 
SSA’s GDP, services 47 percent and industry 31 percent (of which manufacturing contributed 
17.5 per cent).  In 2007, it was estimated that agricultural value-added still contributed a healthy 
15 per cent of GDP while services contribute 52 per cent and industry 33 per cent (of which 
manufacturing accounted for 15 per cent).  In terms of employment, things have not changed 
much either: African economies were overwhelmingly rural in 1960, with agriculture accounting 
for 85 per cent of the labour force.  While the rural share of the population has fallen steadily 
over the past four decades, in 2000 it was still, a 63 per cent, slightly above the 1960 average for 
non-SSA developing countries (Lin, op.cit.) 
 




A closer look at the above trends shows that, over time, the contribution of manufacturing to 
GDP has been decreasing: an indication of de-industrialization.  According to UNIDO (2009), 
Africa’s share of global manufacturing production (excluding South Africa) fell from 0.4 per 
cent in 1980 to 0.3 per cent in 2005 and its share of world manufactured exports from 0.3 per 
cent to 0.2 per cent.  Table 1 compares selected indicators of industrial development for Africa 
and all developing countries in 2005.  The share of manufacturing in GDP is about one third of 
the average for developing countries and in contrast with developing countries as a whole, it is 
declining. Per capita manufactured output and exports a e less than 20 and 10 per cent of 
developing country average, respectively.  The report n tes further that the region has low levels 
of manufactured exports in total exports and of medium-and high technology goods in 
manufactured exports. Indeed, these measures have changed little since the 1990s (UNIDO, 
2009). 
 
Table 1:  Selected Indicators of Industrial Development, 2005 
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39.0 1.65 54.9 13.3 63.6 07.6 - 
Developing 
countries 
487.2 10.05 75.8 57.3 372.9 21.7 + 
 
Source: UNIDO (2009) and Page (2009). 
 
The decline in Africa’s, manufacturing base has been accompanied by a decline in diversity of 
the regions manufacturing sectors and a fall in sophistication of the products produced.  In this 
regard, the manufacturing sector produced narrower range of less sophisticated products in the 
1990s than in the 1980s in sixteen of the eighteen African economies for which production data 
existed.  Page (ibid.) argues that, the fall in manuf cturing sophistication was especially sharp in 
some of the region’s early industrializers – Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia.  The trend 
towards narrowness and less sophistication is a clear indication of Africa’s marginalization in the 
world trade due to decreasing competitiveness, indicative of less presence in domestic and 
international markets and failure to develop industrial structures in sectors and activities with 
higher value addition and technological content (UNIDO, 2012). 
 
Another indicator which depicts the low level of structural change is that of intra-African exports 
and imports. The period between 2000 and 2010 shows that trade within Africa represented 
about 12 per cent of the continent’s total trade in 2010, while major part of trade (88 per percent) 
was with the rest of the world.  During the observation period, the average level of intra-African 
trade, though fluctuating, has consistently remained under 15 per cent over the past decade.  
Again, whereas intra-African exports and imports have had an upward trend, the overall trend 
has been quite modest, oscillating around 10.6 per cent (2000) and 11.7 per cent in 2010 (ECA, 
2013).  
 




The low levels of intra-continental trade are indicative of limited diversification of African 
economies-reflecting high dependence on production of primary commodities which in most 
cases are similar across countries.  Perhaps it is important to emphasize that whenever there is 
increase in intra-African trade, such an increase was triggered by trade in manufacturing.  This 
observation points to the fact that the boosting of intra-African trade would largely be a factor of 
enhanced industrialization process. 
 
We conclude this section by analyzing the position of Africa manufactured exports in relation to 
world’s merchandize exports.  In reference to table 2, one observes that in 1983 less than 10 per 
cent of exports from SSA (excluding South Africa) were manufactured goods.  Since 2000, the 
figure was still below 10 per cent falling to 7.8 per cent in 2003.  This level was lower than the 
case was in 1965 when manufactured exports were around 8.0 per cent of total exports (World 
Bank, 1989).  Even the 9.5 per cent figure in 2005 exaggerates the participation of SSA in 




Table 2:  SSA Exports, Mfg Exports and SSA/World Trade 
 
 Merch Exports Manuf.Exports Percent World Merch 
Exports 
SSA/World 
1980 52715   1,997,905 2.6 
1990 45738 3899 8.5 3,475,109 1.3 
1998 46469 5358 11.5 5,503,777 0.8 
2000 65606 6318 9.6 6,446,307 1.0 
2001 62902 5380 8.6 6,185,332 1.0 
2002 65462 5223 8.0 6,480,740 1.0 
2003 82833 6522 7.8 7,545,646 1.1 
2004 97837 8696 8.9 9,202,77 1.1 
2005 137869 13129 9.5 10,433,970 1.3 
 
Source:  Ajakaiye and Stein, 2007 
  
This low levels of exports show how marginalized African trade has become while other regions 
moved to less resource intensive production with heavier emphasis on information technology 
(IT) and intellectual capital.  Further, the rapid increase of manufactured exports by East Asian 
and Pacific countries have further eroded the share of SSA to the world trade (Ajakaiye and 
Stein, 2007). 
 
3.2 The State of Technological Development 
To the extent that there are strong linkages between manufacturing and technological 
development, we attempt to discuss in this section the state of technological content in the 
manufacturing activity. Studies show that SSA is lagging not just in terms of volume but also in 
terms of technological content in its manufacturing. It is claimed that in certain largely 
traditional activities, it is possible to remain competitive with unskilled cheap labour and by 
processing natural resources.  However, this base is eroding steadily.  In almost all industrial 




activities, competitiveness involves technological hanges, new organizational methods, flexible 
response, greater networking, and closely integrated production systems across firms and 
regions.  This new competition requires better technological capability in every country, 
regardless oof resource base and location-even in cou tries that are not at the frontiers of 
innovation (UNCTAD, 2003). 
 
According to Lall and Wangwe (1998), African manufacturing does not show many signs of 
such upgrading. Its structure remains dominated by low-level processing of national resources 
and the manufacture of simple consumer goods aimed at domestic market. There a few supply 
linkages between large and small enterprises. Productivity growth is poor. Capacity utilization 
has fallen below its peak of many years ago; a significa t part of the recent growth comes from 
utilizing capacity, rather building new capacity.  Technological efficiency is relatively low, with 
little signs of technological dynamism or innovation.  This state of affairs is shared by other 
studies (Biggs, Shah and Srivasatava, 1995) by insist g that African firms are well below 
international “best-practice” technical levels and below levels reached by other developing 
countries. 
 
The above cited studies clearly indicate that SSA has t e lowest share for high technology, and 
the highest for resource-based manufacturing. This being the case, Africa has yet to break away 
from the tradition of exporting unprocessed materials, which is not only the slowest – growing 
segment of world trade, but also the least stimulating in terms of structural entrepreneurial, skill 
and technology growth. Given that the structure of Africa’s production is underpinned by low 
level of technological development, one can with confidence claim that the continents 
technological gap, and the attendant low industrialization, has greatly inhibited the structural 
transformation process. 
 
The technological gap in Africa is not only characterized by a low tertiary-level enrolment in 
technical subjects but also low level of expenditures in research and development (R & D).  For 
example, whereas Africa has a total of about 70,000 engineers, South Korea has a corresponding 
figure of 577,000; the world highest proportion of population enrolled in engineering and other 
technical subjects. Furthermore, whereas the industrialized market economies spend about 2 per 
cent of their  GNP on R & D, Africa’s share is around 0.3 per cent of GNP (UNCTAD, op.cit.). 
 
To the extent that, the picture of Africa’s technological development is gloomy, characterized by 
weak skill base, poorly developed research and innovati n infrastructure, and little mastery of 
simple technologies, one could conclude that the cutting edge of industrial dynamism and 
competitiveness is conspicuously missing in Africa’s socio-development process. 
 
4.0 Factors Undermining Africa’s Industrialization 
 
There are a number of factors which have been identified, by a number of studies, that have 
contributed to the poor performance of the industrial sector in the continent.  Such factors range 
from political and ethnic conflicts, natural disaster , external market shocks, debt, poor 
macroeconomic management, to inadequate infrastructure.  Others are due to poor economic 




condition, disillusionment with past strategies, rent-seeking, political interference, limited 
managerial and technological capabilities (UNCTAD, op.cit). 
 
Although these factors, in one way or another, did impact negatively on the development of the 
sector, we are however of the opinion that the adopted development paradigm, during the 
structural adjust programme (SAPs) and beyond, was the major stumbling block.  This is because 
the adopted paradigm had inherently misconceived assumptions on inclusive and sustainable 
development. The ensuing sub- sections will elaborate on these assumptions. 
 
4.1.1 Neo-Liberalism Paradigm 
The rise of neo-liberalism in Africa was closely associated with the fiscal and debt stock crises 
which governments, both in developed and developing countries, were facing in the 1980s.  This 
development triggered the emergence of a new paradigm which emphasized the virtues of a 
small government; laissez-faire policies and international openness. The main drivers of this 
paradigm change were basically two.  Firstly, conceptual developments that advocated for 
minimal role of the state.  Secondly, the emergence of political leadership in countries like USA, 
UK and Germany (President Reagan, Prime Minister Thatcher and Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
respectively) who championed the adoption of the idea of minimalist  state intervention in the 
economy. 
 
It is in the context of the evolution of global development paradigms, coupled with the socio-
economic crisis of the early 1980s, that Africa had to embrace policy reforms in a neo-liberal 
direction.  These reforms, in turn, were spearheaded by the World Bank and IMF.  These actors, 
through their financial and institutional resources have since then, been able to establish 
hegemony in knowledge production and dissemination and thereby attempt to establish 
hegemony in global and regional policy-making.  The actors, coupled with many research 
organizations, think tanks and academic institutions tend to operate as a giant “knowledge 
monopoly”; edging out competition from alternative p rspectives, analysis or ideas (Guttal, 
2007).  This “monopoly” notwithstanding, there is an influential body of literature emerging, 
which implicitly or explicitly dismisses development as a process towards idealized Western 
Model.  Indeed, China’s growth record over the last30 years and that of other East and South 
Asian countries are manifestations of existence of alternative development models different from 
those championed by the seemingly monopolizers of kn wledge. 
 
The adoption of neo-liberalism in Africa and the sub equent active role of multilateral 
institutions through policy and finances, led to loss of policy space, necessary for charting-out a  
development path which is consistent with the demands of a sustainable and inclusive 
development.  This loss of policy or constrained space was achieved through two main channels.  
First, the lack of feasible alternatives (including sources of finance) that have led much African 
government to accepted a “forced consensus”, especially on macroeconomic policies.  Second, 
the gradual conversion of many African technocrats nd leaders to the ideology of the 
Washington Consensus (WC) and Augmented Washington Consensus (AWC) both in rhetoric 
and action (Shafaeddin, 2006). 
 




4.1.2    The Role of State 
The neo-liberal model advocates for a minimalist state.  This stance was informed by the 
hypothesis that government failure was worse than mrket failure, thus challenging the original 
justification for the expansion of government beyond its night-watchman role and into the role of 
development entrepreneur.  Based on the Research Department of the World Bank, this doctrine 
animated a policy programme of minimizing the role f the state in development and “getting 
prices right”.  No longer was it a matter of governments selecting their industrial investments 
with the correct shadow prices.  Governments were now adjured to divest themselves of state 
industries and to liberalize comprehensively in goods markets, labour markets, financial markets, 
capital markets and foreign-trade markets.  This view became codified in what was called the 
Washington Consensus (Toye, 2003).  
 
This doctrine seems to be misleading over the role of state in any economy.  The historical 
development of countries indicates that governments have played a critical role in reducing 
poverty and accelerating growth through policy-making, investing and showing the way (pace 
maker).  Indeed, evidence from the East Asian countries, which have been able to attain 
sustainable and inclusive development, the story is about governments and businesses 
coordinating to secure high investment, high saving a d re-investment and rapid growth of 
competitive exports in a joint strategy of national growth (ibid.cit). 
 
According to Chang (2009), the dominant neo-liberal view on the role of state in economic 
development suffers from a host of problems.  One, it is based on a very biased reading of 
history of capitalism and globalization.  Two, it portrays tension between its two key components 
– neo-classical economists and liberastarian-Austrian political philosophy.  Three, it fails to 
acknowledge that the interventionist period of the third quarter of the twentieth century was not a 
period of stagnation and inefficiency, as claimed by neoliberals, but saw the world economy 
performing better than during the liberal regimes that preceded and followed it. 
 
For over two decades, Africa’s policy makers and politicians had to embrace the narrow view of 
the role of state, despite its misconceptions and omissions, with its attendant negative impacts on 
the continent.  It is only recently that Africa’s policy makers have started to build a case for “the 
need for a development state”. In this context, the primary goal of the African developmental 
state has been identified as “to overcome the contine ’s inherent development challenges 
focusing on high and sustainable economic growth rates through diversification and 
transformation” (ECA, 2011).  The revisiting of the role of state in the current development 
paradigm, although belated and long overdue, is a commendable move.  However, we cast our 
doubt on its implementation, given the continued dependence on the multilateral institutions. 
 
4.1.3 Addiction to Growth 
The policies and the programmes adopted so far havepl c d alot of emphasis on growth while 
down grading other critical indicators of development.  The over-emphasis on growth was meant 
to show that the reforms have been working and therefore whoever was championing the reforms 
did “a good job”.  It is an undeniable fact that Africa has experienced growth acceleration in the 
1990s and beyond.  However, the growth acceleration does not deserve what others have branded 




as “impressive growth”.  This is because on a deeper look, the performance of record of African 
economies has been profoundly unsettling.  First, non-African growth consistently outpaced 
African growth after 1960, with the result that Sub-Saharan real incomes fell by over 35 percent 
relative to incomes in other developing regions andby-nearly half relative to industrial countries. 
Two, human development gaps widened rather than narrowed overtime and Africa’s cumulative 
progress was insufficient by 2000, to reach the levels of human development the rest of the 
developing world had already attained in 1960.  Three, at the turn of the millennium, nearly half 
of SAA population fall below an income poverty line of USD 1.5 per day up from 35 percent in 
1970 (Ndulu and O’Connell, op.cit.). 
 
The above mentioned indicators, side-by-side with the so called “impressive growth”, are, in 
most cases, down played when reporting on Africa’s socio-economic performance.  This is to 
argue that issues critical to Africa’s long-term development have not been accorded the right 
emphasis because of the narrowness and short-term ho izon of the neo-liberalism models.  
Indeed, the undue emphasis placed on growth has delyed actions on those issues that are critical 
for sustainable and inclusive development.  These range from issues of inequality, structural 
transformation, agricultural and industrial development, and scaling down vulnerability. 
 
The key message here is that growth which does not bring about a structural change is unlikely 
to be sustainable.  Likewise, growth which does not narrow the inequalities across countries, 
regions, urban and rural areas cannot be inclusive.  We conclude this section by making two 
remarks.  Firstly, although growth is necessary for p verty reduction, it is not a sufficient 
condition for inclusive growth. Secondly, the assumption that the effects of policies on economic 
growth are independent of a country’s structural as well as institutional features is untenable. 
 
4.1.4 Industrial Policy Debate 
In line with the minimalist state doctrine, neo-liberals are against state intervention in support of 
industrial transformation with the arguments that st e measures are likely to worsen not improve 
the operation of markets.  According to Ajakaiye, et.al. (2007) the strong anti-industrial policy 
sentiment which has been embedded in the strategies of the World Bank since the early 1980s, 
has had the greatest influence in Africa over the past 25 years. The rationale was clearly laid out 
in the watershed World Development Report of 1983.  The report lays out a series of reasons for 
rejecting state support for industry.  We are not iterested at this juncture to enumerate them.  It 
suffices to emphasize that the World Bank continued with the rejection over the 1980s and 
1990s, even after it had conducted a study to investigate the role of industrial policy in East 
Asian Miracle countries.  In that study, it was found out that the instrument of industrial was 
broadly used by the countries in question.   
 
By the late 1990s, with the growing literature on impediments to industrialization due to market 
failures (Chang, 2003) the Bank began to admit thatere might be a rationale for industrial 
policy intervention. Nonetheless, the Bank continued to show its dislike for the instrument and 
therefore Africa had to live with it.  We would like to echo the point that the market-driven 
reforms, which have been undertaken in Africa and have committed countries to free trade, and 
prohibiting industry related policies are currently being undermined by their own theoretical 




foundations.  Many of the underlying assumptions about market failure which motivated 
industrial policies of the 1960s and were subsequently dismissed as irrelevant in the 1980 have 
made an astounding comeback in economic development th ory.  In addition, new approaches to 
technical change and innovation have generated a huge literature documenting how market 
forces will not produce optimal results and that some kind of state intervention is necessary to 
promote industrialization (Shapiro, 2007).  It is therefore argued that, “a program that encourages 
industrialization can substantially boost income and welfare” (ibid; 54). 
 
The resistance by the neo-liberals to industrial policy is neither tenable in economic development 
history nor informed by a coherent theoretical framework.  The long run histories of the now 
developed countries and the newly developed countries clearly show that an accelerated rate of 
structural change is one of the key features of modern economic development (Kuznets, 1966 
and Chenery 1979).  Therefore, the rise in the share of manufacturing in GDP is one of the most 
firmly established historical patterns together with an even more steeply declining share of 
primary production. 
 
Furthermore, experience from East and South Asian countries shows that the structure of the 
economy changed rapidly towards a strong specialization in non-agriculture in recent decades. 
The evolving sectoral patterns of growth did matter, significantly, for inclusive growth and 
poverty reduction (Palanivel and Gul Unal, op.cit.). 
 
These experiences are supportive of the fact that industrial policy is an indispensable process of 
strategic collaboration between the private and public sectors, where the objectives are to 
identify the constraining factors and the challenges and to design a set of policies to address 
them.  In other words, industrial policy is a stimulant for mobilization of investment and 
promotion of entrepreneurship (Rodrik, 2007). 
 
It is widely acknowledged that Sub-Saharan countries display high agricultural shares in GDP 
and employment averaging 34 and 64 percent respectively, World Bank (2008).  Further, the 
large share of agriculture in these countries suggests that strong growth in the sector is critical for 
fostering overall economic growth. Furthermore, agriculture contributes to shaping the 
environmental sustainability of the growth process, across the development spectrum. This is 
because it is a major user of scarce resources (water and land) and provider of environmental 
services (sequestering carbon, managing watersheds, an  reducing deforestation. 
 
Despite the sector’s central role in unleashing sustainable and inclusive growth, agricultural and 
rural sectors have suffered from neglect and underiv stment over the past 25 years, a period 
which falls well within the implementation of the no-liberal model. The neglect is not only by 
governments but also by donors.  In this regard, public spending for farming has been oscillating 
around 4 percent of total government spending.  Theunder-funding of agriculture has resulted in 
unsatisfactory performance of the sector in Africa, especially when contrasted with the green 
revolution in Asian economies.  Whereas in the Mid-1980s creak yields were comparably low 
and poverty was comparably high, fifteen years later yi lds in South Asia had increased by more 




than 50 per cent and poverty had declined by 30 percent.  On the contrary, yields and poverty in 
Sub-Saharan Africa remained unchanged and food insecurity worsened (World Bank, ibid). 
 
Indeed, “poverty reduction” was not one of the Washington Consensus.  However, the doctrine 
had it that, a small state would be good for growth and growth would be good for poverty 
reduction. Also because poverty is more severe in rural areas and state intervention, regulations 
and organizations disadvantage agriculturalists and advantaged industrialists, a minimalist state 
would tend to reduce the inequality of distribution f income and wealth.  The manifesto of the 
counter-revolution in development was not simply about greater efficiency but also a promoter 
of poverty reduction through growth and equity as well (Toye, op.cit.). 
 
Based on the doctrine, what we see in Africa today is low productivity in agriculture, widening 
gap between urban and rural areas, and environmental degradation.  This is a manifestation of 
the fact that the economic growth which the continent has being experiencing in the 1990s has 
and 2000s been exclusive and not inclusive.  The main argument here is that the pattern of 
growth was biased to the extent that it was not poverty reducing. Therefore, if what matters is the 
pattern of growth for poverty reduction, than the sectoral growth rate in which the poor are 
employed becomes more important than the overall growth rate (Revallion, 2004).  This suggests 
that a dynamic rural sector based on improved agricultural productivity could have promoted 
faster rural poverty reduction and thereby inclusive growth. 
 
Christiaense, Demary and Kuhl (2010) show that growth in agricultural sector is up to 3.2 times 
more effective in reducing one dollar a day poverty when compared to growth in non-agriculture. 
This is not surprising given agriculture utilizes poor people’s key assets namely land and labour, 
and creates economic opportunities in rural areas where majority of the poor live.  The apparent 
attention currently being devoted to agriculture development, by the international community, 
has been propelled by the global food crisis rather an geared towards structural transformation 
and productivity enhancement in Africa. Experience shows that unless a crisis has attained a 
global dimension, it hardly gets the attention of the international community (Moshi, 2012). 
 
4.2 The Neglect of Agriculture 
The literature on development economics underscores th  importance of industrialization in a 
country’s development.  Industrialization is considered as an essential component of structural 
transformation.  Therefore, it has long been recognized as one of the main engines of economic 
growth, especially in the early stages of development. According to Lin (2012) its essential 
characteristics include: (i) an increase in the propo tion of the national income derived from 
manufacturing activities and from secondary industry in general, except for cyclical interruptions 
(ii) a rising trend in the proportion of working poulation engaged in manufacturing and (iii) an 
associated increased in the income per head of the population  (UNIDO (2009) points out that 
only a few countries have been economically successful without industrializing. 
 
Despite its importance, mainstream development economics has paid only limited attention to 
industrialization and its role in structural transformation in recent decades.  This may be 
explained primarily by the failure of industrial policies in some developing countries, and the 




neo-liberal argument that the state cannot do better than the private sector in identifying the new 
industries.  The skepticism about industrial policies, notwithstanding, industrialization has been a 
key feature of successful Asian economies, lifting themselves out of poverty.  On the contrary 
and engulfed in the skepticism, Africa remains one f the most “de-industrialized” continents in 
the world. 
 
The logic underpinned by neo-liberalism had it that import liberalization, devaluation, the 
reduction of protectionism and positive real interest rates will punish inefficient industries and 
reward the efficient ones, which are export-oriented, more labour intensive and use more local 
materials, allowing the country to exploit its comparative advantage. The result will be a 
prosperous and growing sector, which will greatly contribute to an increase in exports while 
using  fewer imports.  Embracing this logic has seen Africa’s marginalization in the context of 
globalization, increased and delayed the diversification of its economies. 
 
The slow growth of the sector has resulted not only i  poor linkages with agriculture, low 
technological capabilities, but also poor provider of employment opportunities especially for 
skilled labour.  Therefore, the fact that the manufcturing sector failed (unable) to play its 
rightful role in the African economies, the ultimate goal of sustainable and inclusive growth was 
not achieved. 
 
5.0  Industrialization: An Imperative  
 
Having analyzed the status of industrialization in Africa, as well as the factors inhibiting its 
effective adoption and implementation, we now attempt to build a case why industrialization and 
technological upgrading are a must, if the continent were to attain higher rates of growth which 
are both inclusive and sustainable.  We present two arguments to support the imperative for 
industrialization. One, there is broad consensus that no country or region in the world has 
achieved prosperity and a decent socio-economic life for its citizens without the development of 
a robust industrial sector. Two, there exists abundance potential, in terms of resources, to trigger 
cum support the process of meaningful industrialization in Africa. 
 
5.1 Centrality of Industrialization 
Africa’s continued marginalization from industrial production and trade can only be effectively 
reversed by fostering industrialization, a key drive  of structural change. This realization should 
be a wakeup call for the continent’s policymakers and politicians.  Experience elsewhere shows 
that the current growth being experienced in Africa cannot be sustained without a structural 
transformation that lifts workers from low-productivi y agriculture and the informal sector to 
higher-productivity activities.  This transformation is yet to take place is SSA. The booming 
price of commodities (oil, cotton, metals, and others) that the continent mostly exports, fueled a 
large part of past decades growth.  This notwithstanding, investments remains low in Africa – 
less than 15 per cent of GDP, compared with 25 per cent in Asia and more than 80 per cent of 
workers are stranded in low-productivity jobs (Dinh, et.al; 2012). 
 




Experience also shows labor-intensive light manufact ring led the economic transformation of 
many of the most successful developing countries.  It needs to be recalled that high employment-
intensity growth and rise in productive activities are important ingredients for poverty reduction 
and inclusive growth.  Indeed, given the high levels of youth unemployment, Africa cannot avoid 
to industrialize.  It is documented that the burden of unemployment is falling disproportionately 
on the youth. With more than two-thirds of its population under 25 years SSA is youngest region 
of the world.  The youth bulge is increasing at an alarming rate. By 2045, 50 per cent of the 
population will be between 15 and 24 years old, adding another 173 million young people to the 
labour force. Across SSA, youth unemployment already stands at 35 per cent.  Therefore, 
creating jobs at a rate fast enough to keep pace with population growth is an enormous challenge 
but an unavoidable undertaking (AfDB, 2012). 
 
5.2 The Potential is Enormous 
The potential for industrialization in Africa can be conceptualized from two perspectives. Firstly, 
the conducive environment in which Africa finds itself currently and the prospects for the future. 
Indeed, most publications portray Africa positively in terms of macro-economic stability, 
investment climate and democratic governance. Of course, there are areas of significant deficit in 
physical transport infrastructure, energy, and corruption.  The outlook also appears positive, with 
many parts of the region forecast to continue experiencing relatively high growth rates and a 
number of African economies predicted to remain among the fastest growing in the foreseeable 
future (Ernst & Young, 2013). 
 
Secondly, Africa’s comparative advantage in terms low cost of labour and in natural resources. 
Indeed, given Africa’s comparatively low skill to labour ratio it needs low-skilled jobs to make 
this happen.  Manufacturing rather than services provides the basis for low-skilled jobs.  
Furthermore, the continent has a strong comparative d antage in natural resources, either in the 
form of energy, minerals or agriculture. These can be drivers of structural transformation through 
linkages, employment, revenue and foreign investmen, provided adequate business environment 
and supporting policies are in place. It needs to be underscored that there is no inherent trade-off 
between commodity-based and labour-intensive industries: countries with natural-resource 
sectors also exhibit diversified manufacturing (UNDP, et.al; 2013). 
 
Africa’s enormous natural wealth is conceived to hold great potential for accelerating structural 
transformation and making growth more inclusive through the channels of putting in place the 
requisite infrastructure, strengthening skills, enha cing agricultural productivity, optimizing 
revenue from natural resources and forging strong linkages to and from the extractive industries.  
The effective performance of these channels will, at the end of the day, usher into a natural 
resource-led industrialization path. 
 
5.3 Getting Down to Business 
In this section we discuss the kind of things which need to be done in order for Africa to 
industrialize.  That is, the “how” to do it. We adopt the perspective that successful 
industrialization in the continent can only be achieved by ensuring that firstly, the development 
paradigm is right, and secondly, ensuring that a conducive investment climate is in place. 





5.3.1 An Appropriate Development paradigm 
Neo-liberalism as a development paradigm is not inherently inappropriate for Africa’s socio-
economic development. Experience shows that its applic tion elsewhere, including the Asia 
countries, USA and Europe, propelled growth and development.  Subsequently, led to 
agricultural productivity, industrialization, employment creation and poverty reduction.  
However, what distinguishes its adoption in Africa from other countries, is the condition of 
dependence underpinning its application.  Under conditio s of dependence adaptation becomes 
difficult, if not impossible.  Likewise, ownership of the development agenda by a country’s 
leadership is strained. Furthermore, long-term development objectives of a country are 
subordinated to short-term objectives of growth, guided by regional and global development 
agenda (MDGs poverty reduction initiatives, social protection, etc.) 
 
As already alluded to earlier, World Bank’s policy conditionalities and the underlining 
assumptions, in most cases, had adverse effects on developing countries, including those in SSA.  
According to UNCTAD “big bang liberalization” contributed to developing countries (excluding 
China) increasing their trade deficit by 3 percentage points of GDP between the 1970s and 
1990s, while the average economic growth rate was lower by 2 percentage points.  Trade 
liberalization sharply increased their import propensity but exports failed to keep pace. Several 
studies have shown that premature trade liberalization during the 1980s and early 1990s was 
accompanied by the de-industrialization of most developing countries (Shafaeddin, 1995 and 
1996).  Africa suffered even more given the early stages of its industrialization process. Indeed, 
as trade liberalization intensified, de-industrializ t on also intensified. 
 
The prominent and minimalist role, assigned to markets and state, respectively was wrongly 
conceptualized.  Both theory and empirics underscore the fact that the market alone is not the 
only tool of coordination of economic activities.  There are roles for the market and the 
government. Their relative importance tends to change in the course of industrialization and 
development. At early stages of development public guidance over markets, and for this the 
capacity of the government machinery for formulation and implementation of policies needs to 
be strengthened (South Centre, 2010). 
 
The road map towards an appropriate development demands, first and foremost, that Africa has 
to reduce its policy and financial dependence on international financial institutions (IFIs).  The 
re-gaining of the lost policy space, under dependence, is fundamental for countries’ 
independence and flexibility in designing their economic, financial and social policies and 
institutions, aligned to their circumstances. This measure has to be complemented by having 
credible leadership, which is visionary and development oriented. In the context of this 
framework, the expected role of the state would be enhanced but in order to perform its 
envisioned role effectively, it has to undergo a major transformation with the ultimate objective 
of nurturing and sustaining a technocratic bureaucracy that effectively plans and delivers the 
expected results and outcomes, (Moshi, 2012b).  Thebelated recognition, by African 
policymakers, of the need for a “developmental state” nd for “the time is now” for Africa’s 
industrialization has to be matched with concrete actions of reducing dependence and building 




state capabilities.  Unless this is done, even the adopted “Action Plan for Accelerated Industrial 
Development of Africa (AIDA)” will hardly be implementable. 
 
5.3.2 Conducive Investment Climate 
Informed and dictated by the appropriate development paradigm a friendly investment climate 
has to be created.  The creation of such an environment is both a state, as well as, a private-
sector’s role. A number of studies, especially from the international donor community, tend to 
claim that the Africa’s poor industrial performance is due to the deficiencies in the investment 
climate.  Thus, playing down the deficiencies in the development paradigm which, in turn, 
undermine policy agenda for putting in place a requisite investment climate. For example, a 
development paradigm which is grounded on minimalist state assumes that the role of building 
infrastructure, skills-development and spearheading regional integration should be shouldered by 
the private sector.  Indeed, such a situation cannot be tenable. 
 
In reality, however, and learning from experiences el ewhere, government’s active role is 
indispensable in putting in place both hard and soft infrastructure, either alone or in partnership 
with the private sector. Without active role for government in these key areas, Africa will 
continue to lag behind other regions in terms of infrastructure gap which is already quite large.  It 
is at least 20 percentage points behind the average for low-income countries on almost all major 
infrastructure measures.  Likewise, lack of skills has been identified as one of the factors that 
constrain unlocking Africa’s industrial potential (Page, 2012). 
 
In ensuring that the investment climate is right for effective mobilization of both domestic and 
foreign investment a comprehensive approach need to be taken on board by focusing on the 
industry system in totality.  Usually, such a system comprises three major components namely: 
intermediary institutions (industry associations, training institutions, technology support, R & D 
institutes, financial institutions, etc); factor markets (natural resources, labour and skills, finance 
input supplies, infrastructure, etc.); business enviro ment (macroeconomic policies, industrial 
trade regimes regulatory and legal framework, etc). In all these components, the need for 
coordination, consultation, and collaboration between the private and the public sector is 
implicitly conspicuous. 
 
In addition, the investment climate improvement efforts should contain incentives that encourage 
firms to compete by exporting. There is solid evidence that firms that export are those with 
higher productivity levels (Söderbom and Teal 2003).  This being the case, it is important for 
countries to embrace an export push strategy throug which firms will learn how to compete. 
Further efforts should also focus towards supporting i dustrial clusters in form of export 
processing zones (EPZs) and the like.  However, in order for these instruments to be effective, in 
attracting a critical mass of firms, they have to have the requisite enablers in terms of physical, 
human and institutional capital.  Indeed, if the EPZs are adequately facilitated they can become 
centres for outsourcing arrangements between local and foreign firms 
 
In the recent past, the improvement in investment climate has attracted a lot of FDI projects into 
Africa, mostly in the extractive activities, services and to some extent in the manufacturing.  The 




challenge remains that of tilting this investment destination towards manufacturing, and ensuring 
that the extractive activities create strong back and forward linkages to the rest of the economy as 
a way of promoting manufacturing. 
 
The other challenge is that of ensuring that the mobilization of foreign investment does not lead 
to offering over-generous concessions to such investors, like granting of tax holidays and other 
monetary incentives. Such concessions are counterproductive as they contradict the objective of 
scaling up domestic resource mobilization as a way of reducing dependence.  In actual fact, 
recent studies show that in spite of the improved investment climate, capital flight from 39 
African countries over the 1970-2010 amounted to USD 1.3 trillion in real terms and up to USD 
1.7 trillion including accumulated interest (Ndikumana et.al., 2012 ).  Indeed, it is ironic that 
poor African countries that are struggling to mobilize resources have vast financial resources that 
they cannot access as they are hidden abroad. 
 
 
6.0   Concluding Remarks 
In this article we have raised both theoretical andempirical arguments to indicate why Africa 
must industrialize, not only as a way of spearheading structural transformation, but also as the 
surest strategy for attaining inclusive and sustainable growth. In other words, we pointed out that 
whereas neo-liberalism managed to revamp GDP growth in a number of African countries in the 
1990s, 2000s and beyond, the quality growth was not consistent with the long-term objectives of 
structural change, inclusive development, job creation and proactive role in the globalization 
process. 
 
These inconsistencies were a product of policies adopte  by most African countries which were 
merchandized by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The policies were neither 
informed by Africa’s quest for structural transformation nor aimed at reducing Africa’s 
marginalization in the globalized world.  In fact the policies were based on wrong assumptions 
on the role of state and industrial policy.  This mis atch led not only to poor performance of the 
agriculture sector but also that of the industrial sector.  Ultimately, the objectives of employment 
creation, enhancement of incomes and productivity, narrowing of technological gap, and 
reduction of inequalities were not attained. 
 
To the extent the African leadership is at least, more aware now, than in the past, of the critical 
role industrialization plays in a country’s socio-economic process,  as a driver of structural 
change, enhancement of technological capabilities and creator of decent jobs, the cry for 
industrialization has become louder.  It is in this context that we feel the time is ripe for 
embarking on serious industrialization drive.  However, the starting point is for Africa to own the 
development process by, first and foremost, adopting a on-dependence development paradigm, 
given that the less dependent a country or  region is, the better positioned to resist policy 
imposition. Therefore, such a paradigm should then inform and underpin policies, strategies and 
incentive structures (investment climate) for structural transformation, while appropriately 
defining the key roles to be played by both the public and the private sector in the process of 
industrialization. 
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